The Consequences of the Single Supervisory Mechanism for Europe's Macro-Prudential Policy Framework

8 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2020

See all articles by André Sapir

André Sapir

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Martin F. Hellwig

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Marco Pagano

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Viral Acharya

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Leszek Balcerowicz

National Bank of Poland

Arnoud Boot

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Markus K. Brunnermeier

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Claudia Buch

Deutsche Bundesbank

Ieke van den

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Charles Calomiris

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Daniel Gros

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Dario Focarelli

ANIA - Italian Association of Insurance Companies; Catholic University of Milan

Alberto Giovannini

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Andreas Ittner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Dirk Schoenmaker

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Charles Wyplosz

University of Geneva - Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: September, 2013

Abstract

The European macro-prudential policy framework operates at two levels. First, the ESRB has a legal responsibility for macro-prudential oversight in the EU. Second, various national and EU authorities have responsibility for the implementation of macro-prudential policy. The creation of a European banking union is an important innovation within this two-level structure. In response to this innovation, this paper makes two key points. First, the ECB should be in charge of macro-prudential policies conferred by the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive. Within the ECB, macro-prudential decisions should be taken entirely by the Governing Council, while micro-prudential decisions should be prepared by the Supervisory Board. Second, the ESRB remains the only EU-wide body in charge of macro-prudential supervision, responsible for all financial activities. The ESRB's effectiveness could be strengthened by creating a post of Managing Director, who would carry out the policy determined by the General Board and would be responsible to the General Board for the management of the ESRB.

Keywords: macroprudential regulation, market integration

JEL Classification: G28

Suggested Citation

Sapir, André and Hellwig, Martin F. and Pagano, Marco and Acharya, Viral and Balcerowicz, Leszek and Boot, Arnoud and Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Buch, Claudia and den, Ieke van and Calomiris, Charles and Gros, Daniel and Focarelli, Dario and Giovannini, Alberto and Ittner, Andreas and Schoenmaker, Dirk and Wyplosz, Charles, The Consequences of the Single Supervisory Mechanism for Europe's Macro-Prudential Policy Framework (September, 2013). ESRB: Advisory Scientific Committee Reports 2013/3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723323

André Sapir (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Martin F. Hellwig

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Marco Pagano

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)

Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Viral Acharya

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Leszek Balcerowicz

National Bank of Poland ( email )

00-919 Warsaw
Poland

Arnoud Boot

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Markus K. Brunnermeier

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Claudia Buch

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

Ieke van Den

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Charles Calomiris

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Daniel Gros

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels ( email )

1 Place du Congres
B-1000 Brussels, 1000
Belgium

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Dario Focarelli

ANIA - Italian Association of Insurance Companies ( email )

Via di San Nicola da Tolentino, 72
Rome, 00187
Italy
+39.06.32688619 (Phone)
+39.06.91622570 (Fax)

Catholic University of Milan ( email )

Largo Gemelli 1
Milan, MI Milano 20123
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://docenti.unicatt.it/ppd2/it/#/it/docenti/71049/dario-focarelli/profilo

Alberto Giovannini

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Andreas Ittner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Dirk Schoenmaker

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.rsm.nl/people/dirk-schoenmaker/

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Charles Wyplosz

University of Geneva - Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) ( email )

PO Box 136
Geneva, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 908 5946 (Phone)
+41 22 733 3049 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://heiwww.unige.ch/~wyplosz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
83
PlumX Metrics