Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy

NYU Abu Dhabi, Working Paper # 0052, 2020

74 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2020

See all articles by Andrzej Baranski

Andrzej Baranski

Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi

Nicholas Haas

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Rebecca Morton

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Date Written: July 1, 2020

Abstract

We report the results of a field-in-the-lab experiment in which subjects bargain over a two-dimensional agenda: a donation to a political interest group and the division of a sum of money. We show that subjects sacrifice monetary gains to secure preferred policies and that behaviorally elicited preference intensity correlates with bargaining behavior. We find an ideological majority advantage and a status quo premium. Minorities benefit most from negotiating on two dimensions because the budgetary division problem allows compromise. Finally, we show that induced preferences over artificial policies fail to capture the bargaining dynamics that arise when real ideological choices are involved.

Keywords: legislative bargaining, field-in-the-lab, pork barrel, measurement

Suggested Citation

Baranski, Andrzej and Haas, Nicholas and Morton, Rebecca, Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy (July 1, 2020). NYU Abu Dhabi, Working Paper # 0052, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3672273 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672273

Andrzej Baranski (Contact Author)

Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

Office 1131 Building A5
NYUAD Campus Sadiyaat
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

HOME PAGE: http://www.abarmad.com

Nicholas Haas

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Rebecca Morton

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-3706 (Phone)

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