Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools

64 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2020

See all articles by Jesse Bruhn

Jesse Bruhn

Department of Economics, Boston University

Scott A. Imberman

Michigan State University; Michigan State University - College of Education

Marcus A. Winters

Boston University, Wheelock College of Education and Human Development; Manhattan Institute for Policy Research

Date Written: July 2020

Abstract

We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers.

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Suggested Citation

Bruhn, Jesse and Imberman, Scott Andrew and Winters, Marcus A., Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools (July 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27607, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665878

Jesse Bruhn (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Boston University ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA
United States

Scott Andrew Imberman

Michigan State University ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

Michigan State University - College of Education ( email )

East Lansing, MI
United States

Marcus A. Winters

Boston University, Wheelock College of Education and Human Development ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Manhattan Institute for Policy Research ( email )

52 Vanderbilt Ave.
New York, NY 10017
United States
212-599-7000 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.manhattan-institute.org

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