Efficiency Wages, Deferred Payments, and Direct Incentives in Agriculture

Posted: 12 Jan 2003

See all articles by Enrico Moretti

Enrico Moretti

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jeffrey M. Perloff

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Empirical evidence from agricultural labor markets is consistent with efficiency-wage theory and inconsistent with several alternative explanations. According to this theory, the higher wage or deferred payment (benefits) that direct-hire growers pay relative to that of farm labor contractors is an efficiency wage. Growers use this extra compensation to lower their monitoring expenses and reduce shirking by workers.

Suggested Citation

Moretti, Enrico and Perloff, Jeffrey M., Efficiency Wages, Deferred Payments, and Direct Incentives in Agriculture. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=366514

Enrico Moretti (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States

HOME PAGE: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~moretti/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jeffrey M. Perloff

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics ( email )

207 Giannini Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-9574 (Phone)
510-643-8911 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://are.berkeley.edu/~perloff

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
738
PlumX Metrics