Coming Early to the Party

63 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2020

See all articles by Mario Bellia

Mario Bellia

European Union - JRC-Ispra, European Commision

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Ca Foscari University of Venice

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Jun Uno

Waseda University

Darya Yuferova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2020

Abstract

We examine the strategic behavior of High Frequency Traders (HFTs) during the pre-opening phase and the opening auction of the NYSE-Euronext Paris exchange. HFTs actively participate, and profitably extract information from the order flow. They also post “flash crash” orders, to gain time priority. They make profits on their last-second orders; however, so do others, suggesting that there is no speed advantage. HFTs lead price discovery, and neither harm nor improve liquidity. They “come early to the party”, and enjoy it (make profits); however, they also help others enjoy the party (improve market quality) and do not have privileges (their speed advantage is not crucial).

Keywords: High-Frequency Traders (HFTs), Proprietary Trading, Opening Auction, Liquidity Provision, Price Discovery

JEL Classification: G12, G14

Suggested Citation

Bellia, Mario and Pelizzon, Loriana and Subrahmanyam, Marti G. and Uno, Jun and Yuferova, Darya, Coming Early to the Party (June 1, 2020). University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 11/WP/2020 , NYU Stern School of Business, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3628305

Mario Bellia

European Union - JRC-Ispra, European Commision ( email )

Via Enrico Fermi 2749, Ispra, VA
Ispra (VA), 21027
Italy

Loriana Pelizzon (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.safe-frankfurt.de

Ca Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Dorsoduro 3246
Venice, Veneto 30123
Italy

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business,
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-68
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0348 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)

Jun Uno

Waseda University ( email )

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo, 1698050
Japan

Darya Yuferova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
36
Abstract Views
389
PlumX Metrics