Gender and Executive Job Mobility: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

68 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2020

See all articles by Xiaohu Guo

Xiaohu Guo

University of Alabama

Vishal K. Gupta

University of Alabama - Department of Management

Sandra Mortal

University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration

Vikram K. Nanda

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics

Date Written: May 23, 2020

Abstract

The increasing presence of women in executive positions has fostered interest in understanding how men and women fare in the managerial labor market. We examine gender differences in managerial job mobility by focusing on managers displaced (almost 90%) when their firms are acquired. Comparing labor market outcomes for similarly-ranked managers from the same target firm and within the same functional area, we find that career disruption results in a larger drop in rank for female managers, despite similar job search efforts. Gender differences are moderated for managers hired by firms with more women in upper echelon positions. Women with rich prior managerial experience and service on external boards also fare well. Our results point to a significant (implicit) ‘gender penalty’ for women in terms of managerial job mobility, but also indicate contexts in which the penalty may be alleviated, and even reversed.

Keywords: executive gender, job mobility, mergers and acquisitions, implicit gender bias, labor market

JEL Classification: G34, J71, J63

Suggested Citation

Guo, Xiaohu and Gupta, Vishal K. and Mortal, Sandra and Nanda, Vikram K., Gender and Executive Job Mobility: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions (May 23, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3610928 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3610928

Xiaohu Guo

University of Alabama ( email )

101 Paul W. Bryant Dr.
Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Vishal K. Gupta

University of Alabama - Department of Management ( email )

101 Paul W. Bryant Dr.
Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Sandra Mortal (Contact Author)

University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration ( email )

Culverhouse College of Business
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0223
United States

Vikram K. Nanda

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics ( email )

2601 North Floyd Road
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083
United States

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