Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets

19 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2020

See all articles by GianCarlo Moschini

GianCarlo Moschini

Iowa State University - Department of Economics

Luisa Menapace

Iowa State University

Daniel Pick

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2008

Abstract

The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high‐quality product is endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a competitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains, although they fall short of delivering the (constrained) first best. The main beneficiaries are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit if production of the high‐quality products draws on scarce factors that they own.

Keywords: competitive industry, free entry/exit, geographical indications, Marshallian stability, quality certification, trademarks, welfare

Suggested Citation

Moschini, GianCarlo and Menapace, Luisa and Pick, Daniel, Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets (August 2008). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, Issue 3, pp. 794-812, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01142.x

GianCarlo Moschini (Contact Author)

Iowa State University - Department of Economics ( email )

260 Heady Hall
Ames, IA 50011
United States

Luisa Menapace

Iowa State University

613 Wallace Road
Ames, IA 50011-2063
United States

Daniel Pick

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
69
PlumX Metrics