Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability

13 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2020

See all articles by Stefan Ambec

Stefan Ambec

University of Toulouse Capitole

Corinne Langinier

University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Stéphane Lemarié

University of Grenoble

Date Written: May 2008

Abstract

To reduce the competition from farmers who self‐produce seed, an inbred line seed producer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two‐period framework, we first investigate the impact of crop durability on self‐production, pricing and switching decisions. Second, we study how the introduction of a fee paid by self‐producing farmers affects those decisions. We find that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers. Further, the introduction of a self‐production fee improves efficiency.

Keywords: durable good, innovation, license fees, Plant Breeder's Rights

Suggested Citation

Ambec, Stefan and Langinier, Corinne and Lemarié, Stéphane, Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability (May 2008). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, Issue 2, pp. 379-391, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01110.x

Stefan Ambec (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse Capitole ( email )

France

Corinne Langinier

University of Alberta - Department of Economics ( email )

8-14 Tory Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4
Canada

Stéphane Lemarié

University of Grenoble

Grenoble
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
51
PlumX Metrics