An Agent-Based Model of Deliberative Democracy and Polarization

29 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2020

See all articles by Bokwon Lee

Bokwon Lee

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)

Yohan Kim

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kyu-Min Lee

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)

Jae-Suk Yang

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)

Date Written: March 9, 2020

Abstract

In this paper, we examined the effect of deliberative democracy on polarization of opinion. Through three cases analyses, we find that deliberative democracy has two major components – provision of information and group discussion. Polarization of opinion can be explained by several theories: social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), social comparison (Isenberg, 1986), and confirmation bias (Kahneman, 2012). We constructed a deliberative democracy model that reflected these mechanisms of polarization. We found that deliberative democracy actually decreased polarization of opinion when group discussion was a strong factor. Our study provides guidelines for institutional design incorporating deliberative democracy, with emphasis on composition of unbiased group discussions.

Keywords: deliberative democracy, polarization, social identity theory, social comparison, conformation bias, group discussion

Suggested Citation

Lee, Bokwon and Kim, Yohan and Lee, Kyu-Min and Yang, Jae-Suk, An Agent-Based Model of Deliberative Democracy and Polarization (March 9, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550897

Bokwon Lee

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) ( email )

373-1 Kusong-dong
Yuson-gu
Taejon 305-701, 130-722
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Yohan Kim

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kyu-Min Lee

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) ( email )

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Jae-Suk Yang (Contact Author)

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) ( email )

291 Daehak-ro
Yuseong-gu
Daejeon, 34141
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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