The Determinants of Multilateral Bargaining: A Comprehensive Analysis of Baron and Ferejohn Majoritarian Bargaining Experiments

35 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2020

See all articles by Andrzej Baranski

Andrzej Baranski

Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi

Rebecca Morton

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Date Written: January 14, 2020

Abstract

We collected and analyzed the data sets of all majoritarian Baron and Ferejohn (1989 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.) experiments through 2018. By exploiting the variation of experimental parameters such as group size and discount factor we are able to test whether or not the theoretical point predictions and comparative statics hold and find virtually no support for the theory. Novel findings are reported about the effect of group size and discounting on distribution of the surplus, the proposer's share, agreement delay, and voting behavior. We also report on off-equilibrium behavior (after subjects fail to agree) and identify strong history-dependent behavior in the form of punishment and loyalty to previous proposers.

Keywords: Multilateral Bargaining; Experiments; Baron and Ferejohn; Meta Analysis

JEL Classification: D72; C78; D03; C92

Suggested Citation

Baranski, Andrzej and Morton, Rebecca, The Determinants of Multilateral Bargaining: A Comprehensive Analysis of Baron and Ferejohn Majoritarian Bargaining Experiments (January 14, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546433

Andrzej Baranski (Contact Author)

Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

Office 1131 Building A5
NYUAD Campus Sadiyaat
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

HOME PAGE: http://www.abarmad.com

Rebecca Morton

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-3706 (Phone)

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