Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information

32 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2020 Last revised: 14 Sep 2020

See all articles by Gilad Bavly

Gilad Bavly

Bar-Ilan University

Yuval Heller

Bar Ilan University

Amnon Schreiber

Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 26, 2020

Abstract

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize’s location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.

Keywords: search duplication, decentralized research, social welfare, incomplete information

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bavly, Gilad and Heller, Yuval and Schreiber, Amnon, Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information (June 26, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3545184 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3545184

Gilad Bavly

Bar-Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
Israel
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

Amnon Schreiber

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905
Israel

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
251
PlumX Metrics