Antitrust and Restrictions on Privacy in the Digital Economy
9 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2020 Last revised: 9 Sep 2020
Date Written: January 24, 2020
We present a model of a market failure based on a requirement provision by digital platforms in the acquisition of personal information from users of other products/services. We establish the economic harm from the market failure and the requirement using traditional antitrust methodology. Eliminating the requirement and the market failure by creating a functioning market for the sale of personal information would create a functioning market for personal information that would benefit users. Even though market harm is established under the assumption that consumers are perfectly informed about the value of their privacy, we show that when users are not well informed, there can be additional harms to this market failure.
Keywords: personal information; Internet search; Google; Facebook; digital; privacy; restrictions of competition; exploitation; market failure; hold up; merger; abuse of a dominant position; unfair commercial practices; excessive data extraction; self-determination; behavioral manipulation; remedies
JEL Classification: K21, L1, L12, L4, L41, L5, L86, L88
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation