When Too Good is Too Much: Social Incentives and Job Selection

28 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2020

See all articles by Tommaso Reggiani

Tommaso Reggiani

Masaryk University

Rainer Michael Rilke

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Abstract

We analyze the effects of substitutability of social incentives on the labor supply of gigworkers (N=944) in a natural field experiment. In our treatments, we vary the proportion of the worker's wage that is donated to a social cause. Our experimental design allows us to observe the decision to accept a job (extensive margin) and different dimensions of productivity (intensive margin). The results show that when the worker has to donate small or moderate parts to a prosocial organization, labor supply on the extensive margin remains unaffected, but productivity on the intensive margin increases; when workers have to give larger portions of their wages, labor supply and productivity decrease. When workers have to donate parts of their wages to an antisocial cause, labor supply on the extensive and intensive margin is negatively affected. We discuss the implications of these results for the understanding of social incentives and corporate social responsibility on labor supply.

Keywords: social incentives, labor supply, CSR, field experiment

JEL Classification: C93, D23, M52

Suggested Citation

Reggiani, Tommaso and Rilke, Rainer Michael, When Too Good is Too Much: Social Incentives and Job Selection. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12905, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525233

Tommaso Reggiani (Contact Author)

Masaryk University ( email )

Zerotinovo nam. 9
60177 Brno, 603 00
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.muni.cz/en/people/241092-tommaso-reggiani

Rainer Michael Rilke

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

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