Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

46 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2019

See all articles by Luca Corazzini

Luca Corazzini

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Christopher Cotton

Queen's University, Department of Economics

Tommaso Reggiani

Masaryk University

Abstract

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects' earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Keywords: delegation, threshold public goods, laboratory experiment, fundraising

JEL Classification: C91, C92, H40, H41, L31

Suggested Citation

Corazzini, Luca and Cotton, Christopher and Reggiani, Tommaso, Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12817, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503767

Luca Corazzini (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.unive.it/pag/16892/

Christopher Cotton

Queen's University, Department of Economics ( email )

Dunning Hall 230
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.christophercotton.ca

Tommaso Reggiani

Masaryk University ( email )

Zerotinovo nam. 9
60177 Brno, 603 00
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.muni.cz/en/people/241092-tommaso-reggiani

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
79
PlumX Metrics