Board Declassification and Bargaining Power

52 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2019

See all articles by Miroslava Straska

Miroslava Straska

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - School of Business

H. Gregory Waller

Virginia Commonwealth University School of Business

Date Written: MArch 2019

Abstract

We examine the relations between recent board declassifications, takeover activity and takeover gains over the period 2003-2011. We report that firms that declassified their boards in the previous five years are more likely to be the target of a takeover than other firms. We also report that these firms receive lower takeover offers and realize lower abnormal returns around the announcement of the transaction. Additionally, the takeover bids received by these firms are more likely to result in a successful takeover. These results are consistent with the interpretation that firms that declassified their boards have lost some bargaining power.

Suggested Citation

Straska, Miroslava and Waller, H. Gregory, Board Declassification and Bargaining Power (MArch 2019). Proceedings of Paris December 2019 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3478519 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478519

Miroslava Straska (Contact Author)

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States

H. Gregory Waller

Virginia Commonwealth University School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23226
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
31
Abstract Views
426
PlumX Metrics