Sexism, Culture, and Firm Value: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein Scandal and the #MeToo Movement

48 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2019 Last revised: 10 Dec 2020

See all articles by Karl V. Lins

Karl V. Lins

University of Utah - Department of Finance

Lukas Roth

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Henri Servaes

London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ane Tamayo

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1, 2020

Abstract

During the Harvey Weinstein and #MeToo events, firms with a non-sexist corporate culture, proxied by having women among the five highest paid executives, earn excess returns of 1.6%. These returns are followed by positive revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. Returns for female-led firms increase to 3.2% in industries with few women executives, and 2.1% and 2.7% if headquartered in states with a high level of sexism or gender pay gap, respectively. Firms in industries with more women executives or headquartered in less sexist states also earn positive abnormal returns. Our evidence attests to the value of having a non-sexist culture.

Keywords: Sexism, culture, female leadership, firm value

JEL Classification: M14, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Lins, Karl V. and Roth, Lukas and Servaes, Henri and Tamayo, Ane Miren, Sexism, Culture, and Firm Value: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein Scandal and the #MeToo Movement (December 1, 2020). University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2019-509 , European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 679/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458312 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3458312

Karl V. Lins

University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )

David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-585-3171 (Phone)
801-581-7214 (Fax)

Lukas Roth

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

2-32E Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-4431 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Henri Servaes (Contact Author)

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7000 8268 (Phone)
+44 20 7000 8201 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.london.edu/hservaes/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Ane Miren Tamayo

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 78494689 (Phone)

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