Deliberation and Epistemic Democracy

56 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2019 Last revised: 23 Feb 2021

See all articles by Marcus Pivato

Marcus Pivato

THEMA, CY Cergy Paris Université

Huihui Ding

University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA

Date Written: August 21, 2019

Abstract

We study the effects of deliberation on epistemic social choice, in two settings. In the first setting, the group faces a binary epistemic decision analogous to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In the second setting, group members have probabilistic beliefs arising from their private information, and the group wants to aggregate these beliefs in a way that makes optimal use of this information. During deliberation, each agent discloses private information to persuade the other agents of her current views. But her views may also evolve over time, as she learns from other agents. This process will improve the performance of the group, but only under certain conditions; these involve the nature of the social decision rule, the group size, and also the presence of “neutral agents” whom the other agents try to persuade.

Keywords: Deliberation, Epistemic social choice, Condorcet Jury Theorem, Probabilistic belief aggregation, Multiplicative pooling

JEL Classification: D71, D83

Suggested Citation

Pivato, Marcus and Ding, Huihui, Deliberation and Epistemic Democracy (August 21, 2019). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440612

Marcus Pivato (Contact Author)

THEMA, CY Cergy Paris Université ( email )

33 Boulevard du Port
Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, Cedex 95011
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/marcuspivato/

Huihui Ding

University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA ( email )

33 boulevard du port
F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, 95011
France

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