Large Shareholders’ Power and the Quality of Corporate Governance: An Analysis of Brazilian Firms

RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE, v. 51, p. 101076, 2019

22 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2019 Last revised: 17 Sep 2020

See all articles by Vicente Lima Crisóstomo

Vicente Lima Crisóstomo

Universidade Federal do Ceará

Isac de Freitas Brandão

Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Ceará

Félix J. López-Iturriaga

Universidad de Valladolid - Department of Finance and Accounting; National Research University Higher School of Economics - International Laboratory of Intangible-driven Economy

Date Written: August 10, 2019

Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to implement the corporate governance system that favors their interests within a framework of highly concentrated ownership and poor legal protection for investors. A metric for corporate governance based on the fulfillment of non-mandatory rules of good corporate governance is used. System GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimates for a balanced panel data of Brazilian firms reveal that the ownership concentration is detrimental to corporate governance quality and the quality of board composition. In accordance with the expropriation effect on principal-principal agency conflicts, by weakening the corporate governance system and board composition, large controlling shareholders may use private benefits of control. As proposed by the substitution effect, in a complementary way, controlling shareholders may renounce strong boards and directly perform management monitoring, mitigating agency conflicts with managers. Finally, the ability of large shareholders other than the main blockholder is not enough to contest his/her power to shape the corporate governance system. The work provides evidence of the prominence of the principal–principal agency problem in an emerging market, by analyzing the effect of ownership concentration over the quality of the corporate governance system, and also that other large non-controlling shareholders are not able to contest the power of the main blockholder.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Ownership Concentration, Agency Theory, Principal–principal Agency Model, Brazil

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Crisóstomo, Vicente Lima and Brandão, Isac and Lopez-Iturriaga, Felix Javier, Large Shareholders’ Power and the Quality of Corporate Governance: An Analysis of Brazilian Firms (August 10, 2019). RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE, v. 51, p. 101076, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435399 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3435399

Vicente Lima Crisóstomo (Contact Author)

Universidade Federal do Ceará ( email )

Fortaleza
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://www.ufc.br

Isac Brandão

Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Ceará ( email )

Fortaleza
Brazil

Felix Javier Lopez-Iturriaga

Universidad de Valladolid - Department of Finance and Accounting ( email )

Avda. Valle Esgueva 6
47011 Valladolid
Spain
+34 983 184 395 (Phone)
+34 983 183830 (Fax)

National Research University Higher School of Economics - International Laboratory of Intangible-driven Economy ( email )

Lebedeva,27
Perm, Perm 614070
Russia

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