Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules

27 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2003

See all articles by Simon J. Evenett

Simon J. Evenett

University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

The effects on national welfare and market access of two important public procurement practices (discrimination and non-transparency) are analyzed with an eye to the ongoing discussions on procurement reform in the Doha Round. The analysis suggests that the welfare payoffs of adopting mechanisms that foster domestic competition and transparency are likely to be greater than the return to efforts to ban international discrimination. However improved transparency, which may well reduce corruption, is unlikely to also result in significant enhancements in market access. This in turn raises questions about the likely enforceability of a WTO agreement on transparency in procurement.

Keywords: Government procurement, public purchasing, WTO, transparency, corruption, Doha Round

JEL Classification: F1, F13, H57

Suggested Citation

Evenett, Simon J. and Hoekman, Bernard, Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules (January 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=342380

Simon J. Evenett (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
44 1865 288 875 (Phone)
44 1865 288 805 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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