Macro-Fiscal Gains from Anti-Corruption Reforms in the Republic of Congo

30 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2019

See all articles by Giovanni Melina

Giovanni Melina

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Hoda Selim

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Concepción Verdugo Yepes

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: June 2019

Abstract

This paper argues that oil revenue management and public investment in Congo are vulnerable to corruption as a result of limited transparency and accountability. Corruption has potentially contributed to poor macro-fiscal outcomes. The paper acknowledges the authorities' anti-corruption efforts made so far and proposes further critical reforms to reduce remaining vulnerabilities. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model results show that, depending on the reforms adopted, the potential additional growth can range between 0.8 to 1.8 percent per year over the next 10 years, and debt can decline by 2.25 to 3 percent of GDP per year over the same period. These results suggest that macro fiscal gains from anti-corruption reforms could be substantial even under conservative reform scenarios.

Keywords: Oil revenues, Oil production, Economic growth, Public investment programs, Public investments, Congo, Africa, corruption, PFM, oil curse, small open economy DSGE Model, DIGNAR, SNPC, RGC, Public Investment, Anti-Corruption, PSAs

JEL Classification: Q32, Q35, E60, D73, E01, H83, Z13, Q, H54

Suggested Citation

Melina, Giovanni and Selim, Hoda and Verdugo-Yepes, Concepcion, Macro-Fiscal Gains from Anti-Corruption Reforms in the Republic of Congo (June 2019). IMF Working Paper No. 19/121, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411030

Giovanni Melina (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Hoda Selim

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Concepcion Verdugo-Yepes

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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