The Strategic Impact of Voluntary vs. Mandated Vertical Restraints on Exclusion of Rivals

19 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2019 Last revised: 9 Mar 2021

See all articles by Jacob Burgdorf

Jacob Burgdorf

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: August 30, 2020

Abstract

It has been shown that manufacturers can employ vertical practices and restraints to prevent entry in markets where upstream entrants require downstream accommodation. I show that if downstream product investment is important and encouraged by the restraint, foreclosing entry this way may not be credible. Additionally, publicly mandated vertical restraints could prevent foreclosure, but if mandates reduce downstream product investment, mandates could have the opposite effect and decrease entry.

Keywords: vertical restraints, entry, antitrust, regulation

JEL Classification: L12, L42, L51

Suggested Citation

Burgdorf, Jacob, The Strategic Impact of Voluntary vs. Mandated Vertical Restraints on Exclusion of Rivals (August 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392402 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392402

Jacob Burgdorf (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
17
Abstract Views
215
PlumX Metrics