Independence of Competition Authorities: The Example of the EU and its Member States

World Competition, Volume 42, Issue 2, June 2019, pp. 149-170

King's College London Law School Research Paper Forthcoming

24 Pages Posted: 7 May 2019 Last revised: 10 Jan 2020

See all articles by Wouter P. J. Wils

Wouter P. J. Wils

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law; European Union - European Commission

Date Written: March 31, 2019

Abstract

At the end of 2018, the European Parliament and Council adopted Directive (EU) 2019/1, often referred to as the 'ECN+ Directive', which, among other things, contains provisions ensuring the independence of the competition authorities of the EU Member States (national competition authorities or NCAs), which are, together with the European Commission, responsible for the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In early 2019, the European Commission visibly showed its own independence by prohibiting Siemens' takeover of Alstom's rail transport business, a proposed merger publicly backed by the German and French governments. This paper gives an overview of the independence guarantees in EU law and discusses more in general the notion of independence of competition authorities and its rationale.

Keywords: antitrust, competition authorities, independence, European Union

JEL Classification: K00, K21, K23, K33, K40, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., Independence of Competition Authorities: The Example of the EU and its Member States (March 31, 2019). World Competition, Volume 42, Issue 2, June 2019, pp. 149-170, King's College London Law School Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370148

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

European Union - European Commission ( email )

Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

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