Partial Norms

61 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2019

See all articles by Giovanna D'Adda

Giovanna D'Adda

Milano University

Martin Dufwenberg

University of Arizona - Department of Economics

Francesco Passarelli

Bocconi University

Guido Tabellini

Bocconi University - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research; Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

Date Written: July 22, 2019

Abstract

We consider an expanded notion of social norms that renders them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence generosity, as predicted. Degree of partiality leads to more dispersion in giving behavior, as predicted.

Keywords: social norms, partial norms, normative expectations, consensus, experiment

JEL Classification: C910, D910

Suggested Citation

D'Adda, Giovanna and Dufwenberg, Martin and Passarelli, Francesco and Tabellini, Guido, Partial Norms (July 22, 2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7568, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362021

Giovanna D'Adda (Contact Author)

Milano University ( email )

Via C. Saldini 50
Milano, 20133
Italy

Martin Dufwenberg

University of Arizona - Department of Economics ( email )

McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States

Francesco Passarelli

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Guido Tabellini

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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