Shareholder Activism in REITs

38 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2019

See all articles by David H. Downs

David H. Downs

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - Department of Finance, Insurance & Real Estate; The Kornblau Institute

Miroslava Straska

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - School of Business

H. Gregory Waller

Virginia Commonwealth University School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: Spring 2019

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that shareholder activism in REITs is less prevalent than in other (non‐REIT) public firms because of stronger barriers to hostile takeovers and potentially less undervaluation. Our results, however, suggest that the conventional wisdom does not hold. Specifically, we find that in 2006–2015, Equity REITs (EREITs) are as likely to be targeted by shareholder activists as non‐EREITs. We also find that shareholder campaign characteristics and determinants, as well as their value consequences, appear similar for EREITs and non‐EREITs. Given that this is the first study to examine shareholder activism in REITs, we raise several questions for future research.

Suggested Citation

Downs, David H. and Straska, Miroslava and Waller, H. Gregory, Shareholder Activism in REITs (Spring 2019). Real Estate Economics, Vol. 47, Issue 1, pp. 66-103, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335358 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12242

David H. Downs (Contact Author)

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - Department of Finance, Insurance & Real Estate ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States

The Kornblau Institute ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States

Miroslava Straska

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States

H. Gregory Waller

Virginia Commonwealth University School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23226
United States

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