The Battle of the Alamo, a Tax Haven?

Posted: 29 Jan 2019

Date Written: January 18, 2019

Abstract

The historical Battle of the Alamo was a thirteen day siege between the dates of February 23 and March 6, 1836. The belligerents were the Mexican Republic—under command of Antonio López de Santa Anna—versus the newly declared Republic of Texas—under command of William Barret Travis. Historians often credit the Battle of the Alamo and the Battle of Goliad as giving enough time and spirit for Samuel Houston to organize the newly formed Republic at Washington on the Brazos to ultimately repel the Mexican army at the Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. However, there is another—possibly second “Battle of the Alamo.” The Internal Revenue Service, “has declared war on tax shelters, and privileged communication is at risk of becoming a civilian casualty. In his “Remember the Alamo” speech, the Service's Chief Counsel compared the fight against tax shelters to the epic battle of the Alamo, but, unlike the fallen heroes of that battle, he declared that the Service would emerge victorious.” Tax havens affect the funds necessary for public revenue and disparage the fairness of the taxation. However, there are many maneuvers that taxpayers have used to create double non taxation and double taxation. In 1794, the Federalists who created the Constitution could likely not have envisioned the vast amount of double tax treaties in existence in the modern day. How do we end double non-taxation, tax havens, and base erosion when certain rules still exist? The answer may be found through application of Hegelian dialects to combat the rules that allow it and the laws that contradict those rules through a synthesis. But the answer possibly resides in the founding laws of the United States and the interpretations purported by the Federalist Papers—that also influenced in part the revolutionaries in Texas in 1836.

Suggested Citation

Lincoln IV, Charles Edward Andrew, The Battle of the Alamo, a Tax Haven? (January 18, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3317986

Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV (Contact Author)

University of Groningen, Faculty of Law ( email )

Groningen
Netherlands

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