Equilibrium Market Volatility in Imperfect Competition of General Equilibrium

30 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2019

See all articles by Dmitry Levando

Dmitry Levando

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Maxim Sakharov

Bauman Moscow State Technical University

Date Written: January 8, 2019

Abstract

We develop a theory of equilibrium market volatility in a general equilibrium duopoly with complete information. The resulting economic system possesses a property, which can be described as ‘natural volatility’ of markets, even if players have complete information.

Economy is described as a strategic market game where every player has market power as a buyer and a seller. Players are uncertain about each other’s actions, and due to the properties of expected utility maximization there is no convergence of common beliefs of common knowledge to unique mixed strategies equilibrium, hence, rational expectations approach cannot be applied.

Volatility at the market appears from a multiplicity of equilibrium mixed strategies; they cannot be computed precisely, but only approximated. We identify several Pareto-efficient strategies and study induced prices, allocations and payoffs, which are all volatile.

Keywords: strategic market games, ill-posed problems, common knowledge, rational expectations, efficient market, price fluctuations, noise trade, sun-spot equilibrium

JEL Classification: C68, C61, C72, D58, E30,E37, G14, G17

Suggested Citation

Levando, Dmitry and Sakharov, Maxim, Equilibrium Market Volatility in Imperfect Competition of General Equilibrium (January 8, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311978 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3311978

Dmitry Levando (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Maxim Sakharov

Bauman Moscow State Technical University ( email )

Brigadirskiy pereulok, 14
Moscow, 105005
Russia

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