Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India

89 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2018

See all articles by Jessica Goldberg

Jessica Goldberg

University of Maryland, Department of Economics

Mario Macis

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Pradeep K. Chintagunta

University of Chicago

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2018

Abstract

We study whether and how peer referrals increase screening, testing, and identification of patients with tuberculosis, an infectious disease responsible for over one million deaths annually. In an experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment centers in India, we find that small financial incentives raise the probability that existing patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in cost-effective identification of new cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks to target for outreach, and they are more effective than health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested.

Suggested Citation

Goldberg, Jessica and Macis, Mario and Chintagunta, Pradeep K., Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India (November 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w25279, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286944

Jessica Goldberg (Contact Author)

University of Maryland, Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

Mario Macis

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Pradeep K. Chintagunta

University of Chicago ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-8015 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

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