Social Identity and Manipulative Interhousehold Transfers Among East African Pastoralists

Cornell University Dept. of Applied Economics & Management Working Paper

45 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2002

See all articles by Marieke Huysentruyt

Marieke Huysentruyt

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)

Christopher B. Barrett

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management

John G. McPeak

Syracuse University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

We model interhousehold transfers between nomadic livestock herders as the state-dependent consequence of individuals' strategic interdependence resulting from the existence of multiple, opposing externalities. A public good security externality among individuals sharing a social (e.g., ethnic) identity in a potentially hostile environment creates incentives to band together. Self-interested interhousehold wealth transfers from wealthier herders to poorer ones may emerge endogenously within a limited wealth space as a means to motivate accompanying migration by the recipient. The distributional reach and size of the transfer are limited, however, by a resource appropriation externality related to the use of common property grazing lands. When this effect dominates, it can induce distributionally regressive transfers from ex ante poor households who want to relieve grazing pressures caused by larger herds. As compared to the extant literature on transfers, our model appears more consistent with the limited available empirical evidence on heterogeneous and changing transfers' patterns among east African pastoralists.

Suggested Citation

Huysentruyt, Marieke E/Els and Barrett, Christopher B. and McPeak, John G., Social Identity and Manipulative Interhousehold Transfers Among East African Pastoralists (July 2004). Cornell University Dept. of Applied Economics & Management Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=328660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.328660

Marieke E/Els Huysentruyt

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 6727 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 6951 (Fax)

Christopher B. Barrett (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management ( email )

315 Warren Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7801
United States
607-255-4489 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/

John G. McPeak

Syracuse University - Department of Economics ( email )

Syracuse, NY 13244-1020
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
62
Abstract Views
1,564
rank
420,128
PlumX Metrics