Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality

43 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2018 Last revised: 24 Feb 2021

See all articles by Andreas Kuhn

Andreas Kuhn

University of Zurich; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Stefan Staubli

University of Calgary

Jean-Philippe Wuellrich

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Josef Zweimüller

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

We estimate the causal effect of permanent and premature exits from the labor force on mortality. To overcome the problem of negative health selection into early retirement, we exploit a policy change in unemployment insurance rules in Austria that allowed workers in eligible regions to exit the labor force 3 years earlier compared to workers in non-eligible regions. Using administrative data with precise information on mortality and retirement, we find that the policy change induced eligible workers to exit the labor force significantly earlier. Instrumental variable estimation results show that for men retiring one year earlier causes a 6.8% increase in the risk of premature death and 0.2 years reduction in the age at death, but has no significant effect for women.

Suggested Citation

Kuhn, Andreas and Staubli, Stefan and Wuellrich, Jean-Philippe and Zweimueller, Josef, Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality (October 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w25124, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262359

Andreas Kuhn (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Bluemlisalpstrasse 10
Zurich, 8006
Switzerland

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Stefan Staubli

University of Calgary ( email )

University Drive
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada

Jean-Philippe Wuellrich

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Mühlebachstrasse 86
Zurich, 8008
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.iew.uzh.ch/index.html

Josef Zweimueller

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+411 634 3724 (Phone)
+411 634 4907 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
6
Abstract Views
135
PlumX Metrics