Outside CEOs of Financial and Non-Financial Firms As Independent Directors on Bank Boards

56 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2018

See all articles by Usman Gilani

Usman Gilani

University of Leeds – Division of Accounting and Finance

Kevin Keasey

University of Leeds - Division of Accounting and Finance

Francesco Vallascas

Durham University; University of Leeds - Faculty of Business

Date Written: September 11, 2018

Abstract

We analyze the appointments of outside CEOs of financial and non-financial firms as independent directors on US bank boards and their implications for the banks and the outside CEO firms. We show that outside CEOs from financial firms match with less traditional banks and their appointment generates long-term benefits for both the appointing bank and the outside CEO firm. CEOs from non-financial firms match instead with more lending-oriented banks but their appointment benefits only the outside CEO firm. Overall, although considered highly skilled directors, outside CEOs do not always contribute to the advising and monitoring quality of bank boards.

Keywords: Bank Boards, Outside CEOs, Business Models

JEL Classification: G21, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Gilani, Usman Javed and Keasey, Kevin and Vallascas, Francesco, Outside CEOs of Financial and Non-Financial Firms As Independent Directors on Bank Boards (September 11, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247546 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3247546

Usman Javed Gilani

University of Leeds – Division of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Leeds University Business School
Maurice Keyworth Building
Leeds, LS6 1AN
United Kingdom

Kevin Keasey

University of Leeds - Division of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom
+44 (0)113 343 2618 (Phone)

Francesco Vallascas (Contact Author)

Durham University ( email )

Mill Hill Lane
Durham, DH1 3LB
United Kingdom

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

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