Gender Wage Gap at the Top, Job Inflexibility and Product Market Competition

52 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2018

See all articles by Fredrik Heyman

Fredrik Heyman

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Lars Persson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2018

Abstract

Research show that women are disadvantaged in inflexible occupations. We show that this will imply that female managers are on average more skilled than male managers. Due to the higher hurdles faced by women, only the most skilled among them will pursue a management career. This implies that female managers will, on average, be more beneficial for the firm when product market competition is intense. Using detailed matched employee-employer data, we find that (i) more intense product market competition leads to relatively higher wages for female managers and (ii) the share of female managers is higher in firms in more competitive industries.

Keywords: Career, Competition, Gender wage-gap, Job Inflexibility, Management

JEL Classification: J7, L2, M5

Suggested Citation

Heyman, Fredrik and Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Persson, Lars, Gender Wage Gap at the Top, Job Inflexibility and Product Market Competition (July 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13075, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222587

Fredrik Heyman (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ifn.se/eng/people/research-faculty/fredrikh_1

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Lars Persson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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