Mere-Liberty in David Hume

Forthcoming, A Companion to David Hume (Universidad Francisco Marroquin)

GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 18-14

40 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2018 Last revised: 14 Oct 2020

See all articles by Daniel B. Klein

Daniel B. Klein

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Erik W. Matson

Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Date Written: June 6, 2018

Abstract

What does Hume mean by liberty? Though clearly important to him, Hume never clarifies the matter explicitly. In his texts, liberty often seems to be a matter of government rules being certain, general, regular, etc., and often a matter of political form or constitution—the place of parliament or republicanism, checks to power, and so on. Many scholars have highlighted such ideas as Hume's idea of liberty. We argue that liberty in Hume bears a central meaning: liberty is a flipside of (commutative) justice. The basic injunction of (commutative) justice is to not mess with other people’s stuff. The flipside is: Others not messing with one's stuff. And it is especially in relation to government (as opposed to, say, a robber) that that flipside concept is what Hume often signifies with the word liberty. Because liberty is polysemous in Hume's writings, we call that meaning “mere-liberty.” Hume sees the achievement of high degree of mere-liberty as dependent on authority, which itself depends on contraventions of mere-liberty. We advance mere-liberty not against the other meanings, but with them, with mere-liberty central to Hume’s political outlook.

Keywords: commutative justice, jural relationships, jural dualism, convention, focal point, mutual coordination, Adam Smith

JEL Classification: B12, B31, K12

Suggested Citation

Klein, Daniel B. and Matson, Erik W., Mere-Liberty in David Hume (June 6, 2018). Forthcoming, A Companion to David Hume (Universidad Francisco Marroquin), GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 18-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192142 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3192142

Daniel B. Klein (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
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HOME PAGE: http://economics.gmu.edu/people/dklein

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Erik W. Matson

Mercatus Center at George Mason University ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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