Central States Pension Fund: Investment Policy Decisions and Challenges Facing the Plan

United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, June 2018

119 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2018 Last revised: 20 Jul 2018

See all articles by Charles A. Jeszeck

Charles A. Jeszeck

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Frank Todisco

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

David Lehrer

Government Accountability Office (GAO); National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)

Charles J Ford

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Laurel E. Beedon

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Jessica Moscovitch

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Layla Moughari

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Joseph Silvestri

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Anjali Tekchandani

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Margaret Weber

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Adam Wendel

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Miranda Wickham

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Date Written: June 4, 2018

Abstract

The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in 1955 to provide pension benefits to trucking industry workers, and is one of the largest multiemployer plans. According to its regulatory filings, CSPF had less than half the estimated funds needed to cover plan liabilities in 1982 at the time it entered into a court-enforceable consent decree that provides for oversight of certain plan activities. Since then, CSPF has made some progress toward achieving its targeted level of funding; however, CSPF has never been more than 75 percent funded and its funding level has weakened since 2002.

Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified numerous factors that contributed to CSPF's financial condition. For example, stakeholders stated that changes within the trucking industry as well as a decline in union membership contributed to CSPF's inability to maintain a healthy contribution base. CSPF's active participants made up about 69 percent of all participants in 1982, but accounted for only 16 percent in 2016. The most dramatic change in active participants occurred in 2007 when the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) withdrew from the plan. At that time, UPS accounted for about 30 percent of the plan's active participants (i.e. workers). In addition, the market declines of 2001 to 2002 and 2008 had a significant negative impact on the plan's long-term investment performance. Stakeholders noted that while each individual factor contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, the interrelated nature of the factors also had a cumulative effect on the plan's financial condition.

Both CSPF's investment policy and the process for setting and executing it have changed several times since the consent decree was established in 1982. The original consent decree gave an independent asset manager — called a named fiduciary — exclusive authority to set and change the plan's investment policies and manage plan assets, and prohibited CSPF trustees from managing assets or making investment decisions. Initially, the named fiduciaries sold the troubled real estate assets acquired during the pre-consent decree era. Subsequent changes include the following:

• In 1993, the named fiduciaries started to increase investment in equities, and their policies continued to direct that asset allocations be weighted toward equities until early 2017.

• Between 2003 and 2010, the court approved three plan decisions to move a total of 50 percent of CSPF's assets into passively-managed accounts (passive management typically seeks to match the performance of a specific market index and reduce investment fees).

• An early-2017 investment policy change precipitated by CSPF's deteriorating financial condition will continue to move plan assets into fixed income investments ahead of projected insolvency, or the date when CSPF is expected to have insufficient assets to pay promised benefits when due. As a result, assets will be gradually transitioned from "return-seeking assets" — such as equities and emerging markets debt — to high-quality investment grade debt and U.S. Treasury securities with intermediate and short-term maturities. The plan is projected to become insolvent on January 1, 2025. CSPF officials and named fiduciary representatives said these changes are intended to reduce the plan's exposure to market risk and volatility, and provide participants greater certainty prior to projected insolvency.

GAO found that CSPF's investment returns and expenses were generally in line with similarly sized institutional investors and with demographically similar multiemployer pension plans. For example, GAO's analysis of returns using the peer group measure used by CSPF known as the Wilshire Associates' Trust Universe Comparison Service (TUCS), showed that CSPF's annual investment returns since 1995 were above the median about as many times as they were below. Similarly, comparing CSPF's returns to a peer group of similar multiemployer defined benefit plans using federally required annual reports found that CSPF's annual investment returns were in line with those of its peers. Specifically, CSPF's annual returns were above the median nine times and below it six times—and CSPF's overall (dollar-weighted) average annual return from 2000 through 2014 was close to that of the peer median average return of 4.8 percent.

In addition, GAO found that CSPF's investment fees and other administrative expenses have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. For example:

• CSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were about 9 percent lower than the median of large defined benefit multiemployer plans over the 2000 through 2014 period — though much of that difference is accounted for by a relative reduction in investment fees since 2007. CSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were, on average, about 34 basis points (or 0.34 percent).

• CSPF's administrative expenses related to the day-to-day operations of the plan have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. CSPF's administrative expenses per participant were below the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans for 12 of the 15 years over the 2000 through 2014 period. As of 2014, CSPF's administrative expense was $98 per participant, which is about 16 percent less than the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans.

Keywords: pension, pbgc, ebsa, gao

Suggested Citation

Jeszeck, Charles A. and Todisco, Frank and Lehrer, David and Ford, Charles J and Beedon, Laurel E. and Moscovitch, Jessica and Moughari, Layla and Silvestri, Joseph and Tekchandani, Anjali and Weber, Margaret and Wendel, Adam and Wickham, Miranda, Central States Pension Fund: Investment Policy Decisions and Challenges Facing the Plan (June 4, 2018). United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, June 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191462 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191462

Charles A. Jeszeck (Contact Author)

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Frank Todisco

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

David Lehrer

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) ( email )

1776 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 615
Washington, DC 20036-1904
United States

Charles J Ford

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Laurel E. Beedon

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Jessica Moscovitch

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Layla Moughari

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Joseph Silvestri

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Anjali Tekchandani

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Margaret Weber

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Adam Wendel

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

Miranda Wickham

Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

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