Internet Appendix for: 'Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership'

25 Pages Posted: 23 May 2018

See all articles by José Azar

José Azar

University of Navarra, IESE Business School; CEPR

Martin C. Schmalz

University of Oxford - Finance; CEPR; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Isabel Tecu

Charles River Associates (CRA)

Date Written: May 10, 2018

Abstract

This internet appendix complements the paper "Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership" and is organized as follows: Section I outlines a model of competition under common ownership that yields the network density measure of common ownership concentration we use in the empirical analysis. The data appendix in section II provides details on data set construction and variable definitions. Section III contains robustness checks and provides additional results described in the main paper.

Keywords: Competition, Ownership, Diversification, Pricing, Antitrust, Governance, Product Market

JEL Classification: L41, L10, G34

Suggested Citation

Azar, José and Schmalz, Martin C. and Tecu, Isabel, Internet Appendix for: 'Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership' (May 10, 2018). Journal of Finance, Vol. 73, No. 4, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3176479

José Azar

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joseazar/

Martin C. Schmalz (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Finance ( email )

United States

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Isabel Tecu

Charles River Associates (CRA) ( email )

1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
331
Abstract Views
1,241
rank
109,892
PlumX Metrics