Labor Market Quotas

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-036/VII

29 Pages Posted: 2 May 2018

See all articles by Suzanne Bijkerk

Suzanne Bijkerk

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Silvia Dominguez-Martinez

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Otto H. Swank

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

Date Written: March 29, 2018

Abstract

Under-representation of women in high level positions is widespread and persistent. We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high level positions. The key point of our paper is that quotas cause asymmetric information about why women work in high level positions. Firms know why they have assigned their own female employees to high level positions, but do not know why women at other firms have been assigned to those positions. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap. We show that ex ante women are better-off without quotas. Next, we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn the abilities of women to make better job-assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit from quotas.

Keywords: labor market quota, winners curse, screening

JEL Classification: D83, J22

Suggested Citation

Bijkerk, Suzanne and Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia and Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. and Swank, Otto H., Labor Market Quotas (March 29, 2018). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-036/VII, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3162572 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3162572

Suzanne Bijkerk (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3000 DR Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland 3062PA
Netherlands

Silvia Dominguez-Martinez

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3000 DR Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland 3062PA
Netherlands

Otto H. Swank

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 4081448 (Phone)
+31 10 2120551 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
35
Abstract Views
435
PlumX Metrics