The Effect of Corporate Governance, Ownership and Tax Aggressiveness on Earnings Management

Acc. Fin. Review 2 (4) 40 – 45 (2017)

6 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2018

See all articles by Nico Alexander

Nico Alexander

Trisakti School of Management

Silvy Christina

Trisakti School of Management

Date Written: December 21, 2017

Abstract

Objective –The purpose of this research is to empirically examine the effect of corporate governance, ownership and tax aggressiveness on earnings management.

Methodology/Technique –The population of this research consists of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2013 and 2015. This research uses 3 recent years and utilizes different variable that have not been used in prior research. The 67 samples were choose using a purposive sampling method. The hypotheses are tested using multiple regression analysis with the SPSS program, to investigate the influence of each independent variable on earnings management.

Findings –The results show that the board of director have a positive influence on earnings management, while board independence, audit quality, managerial ownership, and tax aggressiveness have no influence on earnings management.

Novelty –This research add value in the existing literature and empirically study the effect of the board of directors, independence of the board, audit quality, managerial ownership, and tax aggressiveness on earnings management.

Type of Paper: Empirical

Keywords: Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, Ownership, Tax Aggressiveness

JEL Classification: M40, M41, M49

Suggested Citation

Alexander, Nico and Christina, Silvy, The Effect of Corporate Governance, Ownership and Tax Aggressiveness on Earnings Management (December 21, 2017). Acc. Fin. Review 2 (4) 40 – 45 (2017), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3129312

Nico Alexander (Contact Author)

Trisakti School of Management ( email )

Jakarta
Indonesia

Silvy Christina

Trisakti School of Management

Jakarta
Indonesia

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