Appointed Public Officials and Local Favoritism: Evidence from the German States

49 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2018

See all articles by Thushyanthan Baskaran

Thushyanthan Baskaran

University of Goettingen (Göttingen)

Mariana Lopes da Fonseca

University of St. Gallen

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 11, 2018

Abstract

We study the local favoritism of appointed German state ministers. Matching hand-collected data on ministers’ place of residence to a sample of more than 8,000 west German municipalities during the period 1994–2013, we find that the home municipality of a state minister experiences higher employment growth than control municipalities. Given the institutional context, this effect is ostensibly due to apolitical favoritism (home bias) rather than electoral considerations. We conclude that favoritism may lead to a distortion in the allocation of public resources even in contexts with strong political institutions.

Keywords: distributive politics, favoritism, employment growth

JEL Classification: D730, H700

Suggested Citation

Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, Appointed Public Officials and Local Favoritism: Evidence from the German States (January 11, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6800, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123627

Thushyanthan Baskaran (Contact Author)

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

Mariana Lopes da Fonseca

University of St. Gallen ( email )

Bodanstrasse 8
SIAW-HSG
St.Gallen, 9000
Switzerland

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
35
Abstract Views
336
PlumX Metrics