Majority Rule in the Absence of a Majority

52 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2018

See all articles by Klaus Nehring

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Marcus Pivato

THEMA, CY Cergy Paris Université

Date Written: January 30, 2018

Abstract

Which is the best, impartially most plausible consensus view to serve as the basis of democratic group decision when voters disagree? Assuming that the judgement aggregation problem can be framed as a matter of judging a set of binary propositions (“issues”), we develop a multi-issue majoritarian approach based on the criterion of supermajority efficiency (SME). SME reflects the idea that smaller supermajorities must yield to larger supermajorities so as to obtain better supported, more plausible group judgments. As it is based on a partial ordering, SME delivers unique outcomes only in special cases. In general, one needs to make cardinal, not just ordinal, trade-offs between different supermajorities. Hence we axiomatically characterize the class of additive majority rules, whose (generically unique) outcome can be interpreted as the “on balance most plausible” consensus judgement.

Keywords: Judgement Aggregation, Majoritarian, Supermajority, Hyperreal

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Nehring, Klaus and Pivato, Marcus, Majority Rule in the Absence of a Majority (January 30, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3113575

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-3379 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)

Marcus Pivato (Contact Author)

THEMA, CY Cergy Paris Université ( email )

33 Boulevard du Port
Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, Cedex 95011
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/marcuspivato/

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