Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party

59 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2017 Last revised: 15 May 2021

See all articles by Gregori Galofré-Vilà

Gregori Galofré-Vilà

University of Oxford - Department of Sociology

Christopher M. Meissner

University of California, Davis

Martin McKee

London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine - Department of Public Health

David Stuckler

Bocconi University

Date Written: December 2017

Abstract

We study the link between fiscal austerity and Nazi electoral success. Voting data from a thousand districts and a hundred cities for four elections between 1930 and 1933 shows that areas more affected by austerity (spending cuts and tax increases) had relatively higher vote shares for the Nazi party. We also find that the localities with relatively high austerity experienced relatively high suffering (measured by mortality rates) and these areas’ electorates were more likely to vote for the Nazi party. Our findings are robust to a range of specifications including an instrumental variable strategy and a border-pair policy discontinuity design.

Suggested Citation

Galofré-Vilà, Gregori and Meissner, Christopher M. and McKee, Martin and Stuckler, David, Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party (December 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w24106, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3085719

Gregori Galofré-Vilà (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Department of Sociology ( email )

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Oxford, OX1 3UQ
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Christopher M. Meissner

University of California, Davis ( email )

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Apt 153
Davis, CA 95616
United States

Martin McKee

London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine - Department of Public Health ( email )

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Health Services Research Unit Professor of European Public Health
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United Kingdom
+44 20 7-927 2229 (Phone)
+44 20 7-580 8183 (Fax)

David Stuckler

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

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