Inter-Institutional Power in the European Union

Posted: 26 Oct 2017 Last revised: 20 Dec 2017

See all articles by Serguei Kaniovski

Serguei Kaniovski

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)

Frank Steffen

University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics

Date Written: October 13, 2017

Abstract

We study the power distribution in the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union using van den Brink and Steffen's positional power measure for sequential voting procedures. We show that the Lisbon Treaty failed to equalize the powers of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and left the European Commission the most powerful of the three institutions due to its agenda-setting prerogative.

Keywords: European Union, inter-institutional power, ordinary legislative procedure, positional power measure

Suggested Citation

Kaniovski, Serguei and Steffen, Frank, Inter-Institutional Power in the European Union (October 13, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3059084

Serguei Kaniovski

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) ( email )

P.O. Box 91
Wien, A-1103
Austria

Frank Steffen (Contact Author)

University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics ( email )

Universit├Ątsstra├če 30
Bayreuth, 95447
Germany

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