Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal

Posted: 25 Aug 2002

See all articles by Abhijit V. Banerjee

Abhijit V. Banerjee

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Paul J. Gertler

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Maitreesh Ghatak

London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics

Abstract

The paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity. Theoretically, the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects, a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect. Analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the Indian state of West Bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there.

Suggested Citation

Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Gertler, Paul J. and Ghatak, Maitreesh, Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=303306

Abhijit V. Banerjee (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Paul J. Gertler

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Maitreesh Ghatak

London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/adds/ghatak/cv-lse-sept02.pdf

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