Leviathan Inc. and Corporate Environmental Engagement

84 Pages Posted: 1 May 2017 Last revised: 11 Jan 2021

See all articles by Po-Hsuan Hsu

Po-Hsuan Hsu

National Tsing Hua University - Department of Quantitative Finance

Hao Liang

Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: December 22, 2020

Abstract

In a 2010 special report, The Economist magazine termed the resurgence of state-owned, publicly listed enterprises “Leviathan Inc.” and criticized the poor governance and low efficiency of these firms. We compile a new comprehensive dataset of state ownership of publicly listed firms in 44 countries over the period of 2004–2017 and show that state-owned enterprises are more responsive to environmental issues. The effect is more pronounced in economies lacking energy security and strong environmental regulation, and among firms with more local operations and higher domestic government ownership. We find a similar effect on corporate social engagement but not on governance quality. These results suggest a different role for “Leviathan Inc.,” especially in dealing with environmental externalities.

Keywords: state ownership, environmental engagement, sustainability, ownership structure

JEL Classification: G32, H11, H41, Q56

Suggested Citation

Hsu, Po-Hsuan and Liang, Hao and Matos, Pedro, Leviathan Inc. and Corporate Environmental Engagement (December 22, 2020). Darden Business School Working Paper No. 2960832, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 526/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2960832

Po-Hsuan Hsu

National Tsing Hua University - Department of Quantitative Finance ( email )

101, Section 2, Kuang-Fu Road
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300
China

Hao Liang (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business ( email )

469 Bukit Timah Road
Singapore 912409
Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://business.smu.edu.sg/faculty/profile/130396/LIANG-Hao

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
434 243 8998 (Phone)
434 924 0726 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.darden.virginia.edu/faculty-research/directory/pedro-matos/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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