The Effects of Works Councils on Overtime Hours

26 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2017

See all articles by Rafael Gralla

Rafael Gralla

Technical University of Dortmund

Kornelius Kraft

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Stanislav Volgushev

Ruhr University of Bochum - Faculty of Mathematics

Date Written: May 2017

Abstract

This study analyzes the relation between works councils and overtime hours in Germany. The estimated effects differ considerably in dependence of standard contracted working time. Furthermore, we find differences across the quantiles of the overtime hours distribution and these differences between quantiles also vary between employees of establishment with and without works councils. By considering contracted working time effects and comparing conditional quantiles we find in some quantiles that employees of establishments with a works council have a higher amount of overtime hours if an employee regularly works 35 hours per week. This effect diminishes with increasing quantiles of the distribution of overtime hours. If an employee of a codetermined establishment regularly works 40 hours per week, overtime hours are reduced. This reduction becomes larger if higher quantiles are analyzed.

Suggested Citation

Gralla, Rafael and Kraft, Kornelius and Volgushev, Stanislav, The Effects of Works Councils on Overtime Hours (May 2017). Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, Issue 2, pp. 143-168, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2944827 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12120

Rafael Gralla (Contact Author)

Technical University of Dortmund ( email )

Emil-Figge-Stra├če 50
Dortmund, 44227
Germany

Kornelius Kraft

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics ( email )

D-44221 Dortmund
Germany
+49 231 755-3152 (Phone)
+49 231 755-3155 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Stanislav Volgushev

Ruhr University of Bochum - Faculty of Mathematics

D-44780 Bochum
Germany

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