Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization

37 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2017

See all articles by Ronald J. Gilson

Ronald J. Gilson

Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Stanford Law School

Mark J. Roe

Harvard Law School

Date Written: January 1, 1993

Abstract

We aim here for a better understanding of the Japanese keiretsu. Our essential claim is that to understand the Japanese system-banks with extensive investment in industry and industry with extensive cross-ownership-we must understand the problems of industrial organization, not just the problems of corporate governance. The Japanese system, we assert, functions not only to harmonize the relationships among the corporation, its shareholders, and its senior managers, but also to facilitate productive efficiency.

Keywords: contractual governance; corporate governance; cross-ownership; Japanese keiretsu;

JEL Classification: G21, G34, L14, L21, L23, L24

Suggested Citation

Gilson, Ronald J. and Roe, Mark J., Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization (January 1, 1993). Yale Law Journal, Vol. 102, No. 4, 1993, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper, Harvard Public Law Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2938089

Ronald J. Gilson

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Stanford Law School ( email )

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Mark J. Roe (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

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