Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies

Asian Development Review 34:1

NYU Wagner Research Paper No. 2928818

23 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2017

See all articles by Paris Adler

Paris Adler

Independent

Drusilla K. Brown

Tufts University - Department of Economics

Rajeev H. Dehejia

New York University (NYU) - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo

George Domat

Independent

Raymond Robertson

Texas A&M University

Date Written: March 7, 2017

Abstract

This paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life assessments and reduce measures of depression and traumatic stress. We find significant deviations in manager perceptions of working conditions from those of workers. These deviations significantly impact a worker's perception of well-being and indicators of mental health. Such deviations may lead the factory manager to underprovide certain workplace amenities relative to the cost-minimizing configuration, which may in part explain the persistence of relatively poor working conditions in developing economies.

Keywords: apparel, human resource management, working conditions, Viet Nam

JEL Classification: J32, J81, O15

Suggested Citation

Adler, Paris and Brown, Drusilla K. and Dehejia, Rajeev H. and Domat, George and Robertson, Raymond, Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies (March 7, 2017). Asian Development Review 34:1, NYU Wagner Research Paper No. 2928818, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928818

Paris Adler

Independent

Drusilla K. Brown

Tufts University - Department of Economics ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States
617-627-3096 (Phone)
617-627-3917 (Fax)

Rajeev H. Dehejia (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service ( email )

The Puck Building
295 Lafayette Street, Second Floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

HOME PAGE: http://users.nber.org/~rdehejia/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://users.nber.org/~rdehejia/

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

George Domat

Independent

Raymond Robertson

Texas A&M University ( email )

TAMU 4220
1004 George Bush Dr West
College Station, TX 77843
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
310
PlumX Metrics