Transferability of Migration Licenses and the Distribution of Potential Rents

31 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2001 Last revised: 25 Oct 2010

See all articles by Laura L. Bivins

Laura L. Bivins

Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics

Kala Krishna

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: December 2001

Abstract

This paper compares the effects of migration restrictions using licenses which are freely traded in a competitive labor market to those that occur when licenses are allocated to firms who are not permitted to trade them. There is reason to expect that a policy of making licenses non-transferable will not only affect production efficiency, but also to allow producers to capture more of the potential migration rents. Applications to migration policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are discussed.

Suggested Citation

Lafean Bivins, Laura and Krishna, Kala, Transferability of Migration Licenses and the Distribution of Potential Rents (December 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8619, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=292518

Laura Lafean Bivins

Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics ( email )

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Kala Krishna (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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