Matching Pennies on the Campaign Trail: An Empirical Study of Senate Elections and Media Coverage

58 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2017

See all articles by Camilo Garcia-Jimeno

Camilo Garcia-Jimeno

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Pinar Yildirim

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2017

Abstract

We study the strategic interaction between the media and Senate candidates during elections. While the media is instrumental for candidates to communicate with voters, candidates and media outlets have conflicting preferences over the contents of the reporting. In competitive electoral environments such as most US Senate races, this can lead to a strategic environment resembling a matching pennies game. Based on this observation, we develop a model of bipartisan races where media outlets report about candidates, and candidates make decisions on the type of constituencies to target with their statements along the campaign trail. We develop a methodology to classify news content as suggestive of the target audience of candidate speech, and show how data on media reports and poll results, together with the behavioral implications of the model, can be used to estimate its parameters. We implement this methodology on US Senatorial races for the period 1980-2012, and find that Democratic candidates have stronger incentives to target their messages towards turning out their core supporters than Republicans. We also find that the cost in swing-voter support from targeting core supporters is larger for Democrats than for Republicans. These effects balance each other, making media outlets willing to cover candidates from both parties at similar rates.

Suggested Citation

Garcia-Jimeno, Camilo and Yildirim, Pinar, Matching Pennies on the Campaign Trail: An Empirical Study of Senate Elections and Media Coverage (February 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w23198, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2924288

Camilo Garcia-Jimeno (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

Pinar Yildirim

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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