Supplementary Appendix to Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

11 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2017

See all articles by Yuval Heller

Yuval Heller

Bar Ilan University

Erik Mohlin

University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine

Date Written: February 11, 2017

Abstract

Abstract In Heller and Mohlin (2017) we develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals have the advantage of being able to deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions in some of the matches. In the remaining matches, the individuals perfectly observe each other's preferences. Our main result shows that, essentially, only efficient outcomes can be stable. Moreover, under additional mild assumptions, we show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from unilateral deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception in the environment. In this supplementary analysis we relax the assumption of perfect observability in matches without deception, and study the robustness of our main results to the introduction of partial observability.

Suggested Citation

Heller, Yuval and Mohlin, Erik, Supplementary Appendix to Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli (February 11, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2915700 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2915700

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
Israel
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

Erik Mohlin

University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine ( email )

New Road
Oxford, OX1 1NF
United Kingdom

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