Efficiency of French Privatizations: A Dynamic Vision

Universite de Bourgogne, Latec-Cerfargo, Working Paper No. 01-01

36 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2001

See all articles by Hervé Alexandre

Hervé Alexandre

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University

Gerard J. Charreaux

Universite de Bourgogne - LEG/FARGO

Date Written: November 2001

Abstract

The French privatizations program is one of the principal programs worldwide regarding the volume of equity issues. A reading of the privatization process through the corporate governance theory resulted in the development of a model allowing to take into account, on the one hand, the temporal dimension of the privatization process, and on the other hand, the contextual, organizational, governance and strategic variables that influence this process. After having replicated a certain number of traditional tests, we tested this model on a sample of 19 French privatized firms over a seven-year horizon, which resulted in the following conclusions. The favorable incidence traditionally attributed to privatizations was not truly confirmed for French privatizations, at least for the considered horizon. Privatization induces a significant positive effect on performance for only a small number of firms. The importance of the effect, however, is subordinate to some of the suggested variables.

Keywords: privatization, static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G390, L320, L330

Suggested Citation

Alexandre, Hervé and Charreaux, Gerard, Efficiency of French Privatizations: A Dynamic Vision (November 2001). Universite de Bourgogne, Latec-Cerfargo, Working Paper No. 01-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=290771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.290771

Hervé Alexandre

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris, 75016
France

Gerard Charreaux (Contact Author)

Universite de Bourgogne - LEG/FARGO ( email )

2, Bd Gabriel, BP 26611
Pole d'economie et de gestion
Dijon Cedex, 21066
France
33380395435 (Phone)
33380395488 (Fax)

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