Investing in Conflict Management

UC-Irvine, Economics Working Paper No. 00-01-17

19 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2001

See all articles by Garance Genicot

Garance Genicot

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Stergios Skaperdas

University of California - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 2000

Abstract

Achieving peace and building the institutions that will make it last require much time and effort on the part of adversaries. While making this effort, the likelihood of peace is uncertain and preparations for conflict are on-going. We examine a setting that takes such considerations into account.

Adversaries divide their resources between "guns," "butter," and investments in conflict management. Even when all adversaries undertake sizable investments in conflict management, peace is uncertain. We find that larger initial wealth increases the likelihood of peace, whereas the number of adversaries can have widely different effects. A larger number of adversaries in cases of international conflict tends to increase the likelihood of peace, but it has the opposite effect in cases of domestic conflict.

Keywords: conflict, institution, war, fragmentation

JEL Classification: D74, N4

Suggested Citation

Genicot, Garance and Skaperdas, Stergios, Investing in Conflict Management (December 2000). UC-Irvine, Economics Working Paper No. 00-01-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=289861 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289861

Garance Genicot (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-7144 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/gg58

Stergios Skaperdas

University of California - Department of Economics ( email )

3123 Social Science Plaza A
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
714-824-4167 (Phone)
714-824-2182 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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